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ABSTRACT 
Hoarding and scrupulous OCD are part of the Obsessive-Compulsive and 
Related Disorders, which are characterized by obsessional preoccupation and 
ritualistic behavior. Prior research has found a statistical relationship between 
hoarding and scrupulosity after controlling for these common factors, suggesting the 
existence of other features shared by these two disorders. Clinical accounts and 
empirical research of hoarding and scrupulosity suggest three such shared factors: a 
tendency to experience intense guilt and shame, rigid moralistic thinking, and general 
cognitive rigidity. However, results of the current study show that, although both 
hoarding and scrupulosity were related to cognitive rigidity and a tendency to 
experience guilt and shame, they are not associated with rigid moralistic thinking. 
Instead, beliefs about the importance of emotions as moral guides were related to both 
disorders. These results are interpreted in terms of dual-process theories of moral 
reasoning. Additionally, implications for the conceptualization and treatment of 
hoarding and scrupulosity are discussed.   




Statement of the Problem 
The clinical disorders collectively known as the Obsessive-Compulsive and 
Related Disorders (OCRDs; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) are 
characterized by anxiety, obsessional preoccupation, and ritualistic behavior 
(Steketee, 2012). However, two particular conditions from within this category – 
hoarding disorder (HD) and scrupulosity – have demonstrated a significant statistical 
relationship above and beyond these common features (Rowley, Timpano, & 
Schmidt, 2011). This relationship is surprising given the dissimilarity between these 
disorders in terms of clinical phenomenology: hoarding involves difficulty discarding 
possessions and the accumulation of clutter that significantly impacts living spaces 
(Frost & Hartl, 1996), whereas scrupulosity is a form of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) featuring fears about religion, morality, and sin (Nelson, 
Abramowitz, Whiteside, & Deacon, 2006). Both disorders are difficult to treat 
(Mataix-Cols, Marks, Greist, Kobak, & Baer, 2002; Tolin, Frost, Steketee, & Muroff, 
2015), and specialized forms of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for each 
condition have been developed (Huppert & Siev, 2010; Steketee & Frost, 2013). One 
possible way to enhance these treatments is to explain the surprising statistical 
relationship between hoarding and scrupulosity by identifying features that are 
common to both disorders and integrating treatment strategies that address these 
shared features. 
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 An obvious starting point for identifying such shared features is the 
prominence of guilt and shame in clinical and theoretical descriptions of both 
hoarding and scrupulosity (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014; Frost & Hartl, 1996; 
Steketee & Frost, 2013). In hoarding, guilt and shame often result from the perceived 
immorality of wasting possessions (Frost, Steketee, & Tolin, 2012). In scrupulosity, 
these emotions may be even more prominent, as an obsession with potential moral 
transgressions is one of the defining features of the disorder (Nelson et al., 2006). 
Therefore, it is possible that being prone to intense experiences of guilt and shame is 
one of the factors that connect hoarding and scrupulosity. Additionally, it follows that 
hoarding and scrupulosity may also be related to a particular style of moral reasoning 
that leads to these overwhelming emotions. In fact, individuals with these conditions 
and related disorders have been described as morally rigid, prone to dichotomous 
thinking about right and wrong, and obsessed with moral rules (Frost & Steketee, 
2010; Gangemi, Mancini, & van den Hout, 2007; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; 
Whitton, Henry, & Grisham, 2014). Moreover, this rigid thinking about matters of 
morality may be embedded in a larger pattern of cognitive rigidity, which is 
suggested by the prevalence of obsessive-compulsive personality traits in individuals 
with both hoarding and scrupulosity (MataixCols, Baer, Rauch, & Jenike, 2000; 
Siev, Steketee, Fama, & Wilhelm, 2011). 
 The current investigation was designed to assess the extent to which these 
three factors – guilt and shame, rigid moralistic thinking, and cognitive rigidity – 
explain the relationship between hoarding and scrupulosity. It begins with a 
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replication of previous research findings showing a robust relationship between these 
two clinical conditions, and proceeds to examine whether the three hypothesized 
shared features account for this statistical relationship. Finally, the explanation of the 
hoarding-scrupulosity relationship is further refined through post-hoc, exploratory 
analyses of other aspects of moral reasoning. 
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CHAPTER II  
Review of the Literature 
 This chapter begins by reviewing the clinical, theoretical, and empirical 
literature on the phenomenology, cognitive-behavioral models, and treatment of 
hoarding and scrupulosity. After establishing this overview of foundational 
knowledge, specific attention is paid to findings linking the two disorders and to the 
evidence suggesting that guilt and shame, moralistic thinking, and cognitive rigidity 
might explain this link. 
Hoarding Disorder 
Clinical Features 
HD is characterized by difficulties discarding possessions, clutter that 
interferes with living spaces, and clinically significant emotional distress or 
functional impairment (Frost & Hartl, 1996; Tolin, 2011).  Excessive acquisition of 
objects, though not required for a diagnosis of HD, occurs alongside difficulty 
discarding in most cases (Frost, Tolin, Steketee, Fitch, & Selbo-Bruns, 2009). The 
types of possessions that are acquired and saved in pathological hoarding vary by 
individual and are often similar to the types of items saved by healthy individuals 
(Frost, Hartl, Christian, & Williams, 1995). Common examples include food, books, 
newspapers, photographs, clothing, or documents. However, hoarding is 
distinguished from normative saving by a number of features, including the quantity 
of possessions saved, the intensity of emotional distress when facing a decision to 
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discard, and the level of clutter caused by compulsive saving (Frost & Hartl, 1996; 
Frost et al., 1995).  
Common reasons that people report for hoarding possessions include a sense 
of responsibility for their belongings, the use of objects as visual reminders to 
compensate for poor memory abilities, a strong desire to exert control over 
possessions, and the belief that wasting objects is morally wrong (Steketee, Frost, & 
Kyrios, 2003). People who hoard also report intense emotional attachments to objects, 
including beliefs that their possessions feel like extensions of themselves and that 
discarding objects would feel like losing a part of their lives (Steketee et al., 2003). 
When faced with decisions about discarding possessions, people who hoard 
experience a variety of negative emotions including anxiety, anger, sadness, disgust, 
regret, guilt, and shame (Frost & Hartl, 1996; Frost et al., 1995; Frost & Steketee, 
2010; Steketee & Frost, 2013). Conversely, acquisition of new possessions results in 
temporary relief from negative emotions and short-term exhilaration or heightened 
self-esteem (L. M. Lawrence, Ciorciari, & Kyrios, 2014).  
Beyond the primary symptoms of acquisition, difficulty discarding, clutter, 
and distress, associated features of HD including perfectionism (Frost & Gross, 1993; 
Steketee & Frost, 2003), indecisiveness (Fitch & Cougle, 2013), anxiety sensitivity 
(Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Steketee, 2003) and avoidant and obsessive-compulsive 
personality traits (MataixCols et al., 2000). Individuals who hoard also frequently 
demonstrate poor insight regarding their hoarding beliefs and behaviors, with one 
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study finding that more than 50% were described by family members as having poor 
to delusional insight into their disorder (Tolin, Fitch, Frost, & Steketee, 2010).  
The effects of HD include poor physical and mental health, financial hardship 
(Tolin, Frost, Steketee, Gray, & Fitch, 2008) and impaired social relationships 
(Ayers, Najmi, Howard, & Maddox, 2014). Family functioning is also negatively 
impacted and adult children of individuals who hoard report increased anxiety, 
depression, and social impairment (Park, 2015). Beyond individuals and families, 
hoarding places a significant burden on communal systems due to lost work 
productivity, high levels of mental health and other medical service utilization, and 
involvement by social service agencies (Tolin et al., 2008).  
Diagnosis of HD 
Prior to the early 1990s, hoarding was generally thought of as a manifestation 
of OCD or Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCDP; Frost & Steketee, 
2014). Following the publication of two seminal papers on hoarding (Frost & Gross, 
1993; Frost & Hartl, 1996), many researchers began to critique this approach and to 
conceptualize hoarding as a unique syndrome. Since that time, empirical evidence 
supporting this conceptualization has come from multiple lines of research in the 
areas of psychopathology, epidemiology, genetics, neuroimaging, neuropsychology, 
personality, and treatment (Frost & Steketee, 2014; Mataix-Cols et al., 2010). As a 
result, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
(DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) includes Hoarding Disorder as a 
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separate diagnosis from OCD, with both diagnoses included in the superordinate 
category of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders. 
  There are six DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for HD.  Criteria A, B, and C address 
the primary symptoms of difficulty discarding, the perceived need to save possessions 
and distress associated with discarding, and clutter that interferes with living areas. 
Criteria D addresses functional impairment, and Criteria E and F rule out medical 
conditions and other mental disorders as causes of the hoarding behavior. A “With 
excessive acquisition” specifier is optional, and research suggests this specifier is 
appropriate in almost 90% of cases (Frost et al., 2009). Finally, a specifier is given to 
describe insight as either good or fair, poor, or absent or delusional.  
Comorbidity 
Approximately three quarters of individuals with HD have comorbid mental 
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), with depressive and anxiety 
disorders being the most common (Frost, Steketee, & Tolin, 2011; Tolin et al., 2012). 
People who hoard also frequently display symptoms of OCD, but estimates of the 
prevalence of OCD in the hoarding population have been complicated by 
measurement and recruitment issues related to the historical connection between the 
two disorders (Wheaton & Van Meter, 2014). Another common comorbidity is 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), with up to 30% of individuals 
who hoard reporting a formal diagnosis or a history of symptoms, particularly of 
inattention (Grisham, Brown, Savage, Steketee, & Barlow, 2007). Additionally, 
trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder have been strongly associated with hoarding, 
LINKING HOARDING AND SCRUPULOSITY 
 
9 
and many people who hoard report a connection between traumatic life events and the 
onset of hoarding symptoms (Landau et al., 2011). 
Cognitive-Behavioral Models of HD  
Frost and Hartl (1996) first elaborated a cognitive-behavioral model of 
hoarding based on their extensive clinical experience and a handful of preliminary 
studies. They identified four primary components in their model: information 
processing deficits, dysfunctional beliefs, emotional attachments, and behavioral 
avoidance. Subsequent empirical studies have provided support for a number of their 
propositions and continue to expand the scope of the model to include additional 
etiological and maintenance factors (Steketee et al., 2003; Tolin, 2011; Woody, 
Kellman-McFarlane, & Welsted, 2014).   
In the current model (see Figure 1), problems with acquiring and discarding 
possessions are hypothesized to originate in psychosocial vulnerability factors and 
biologically based information processing deficits (Steketee & Frost, 2013). 
Psychosocial factors include past experiences and learning history, negative core 
beliefs, comorbid depression and anxiety, and personality traits of perfectionism, 
anxiety sensitivity, and dependency. These factors contribute to the development of 
dysfunctional beliefs about identity, responsibility, memory, and control over 
personal possessions, which in turn result in negative emotional reactions such as 
sadness, anxiety, guilt, shame, and anger when possessions are discarded (Steketee & 
Frost, 2013). The termination or avoidance of these unpleasant emotions negatively 
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emotions when new objects are obtained, and this positive reinforcement creates a 
cycle of compulsive acquisition (Kyrios, 2013).  The accumulation of clutter and the 
chaotic appearance of living spaces are exacerbated by information processing 
deficits in attention, memory, decision-making, and categorization, which add to the 
difficulty of discarding and inhibit the effective organization of possessions 
(Timpano, Smith, Yang, & Çek, 2014).  
The hypotheses of this model have largely been supported in the research 
literature, with the most commonly examined subjects being avoidance, dysfunctional 
beliefs, emotional attachments, and information processing deficits (Tolin, 2011). 
However, in relation to the current study, it is important to note that guilt and shame, 
despite being included in the model, are almost never measured in studies of hoarding 
(Weingarden & Renshaw, 2015). Similarly, although guilt and shame are considered 
moral emotions (Tangney & Dearing, 2003) and beliefs about responsibility 
presumably relate to moral beliefs, no details about the process by which these beliefs 
influence emotions are specified in the model.  
Treatment for HD 
  Just as the assessment and diagnosis of compulsive hoarding were previously 
conceptualized within an OCD framework, treatment for individuals presenting with 
hoarding difficulties has historically been conducted using approaches designed for 
OCD, especially ERP and other forms of CBT (Steketee, 2014). However, outcome 
studies investigating these treatments indicated that individuals with hoarding 
symptoms benefit significantly less than OCD patients, suggesting the need 
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specialized treatment specific to hoarding (Bloch et al., 2014). To meet this need, 
hoarding specialists have developed a multi-component CBT approach that has been 
disseminated through therapist guides for individual (Steketee & Frost, 2007, 2013) 
and group formats (Muroff, Underwood, & Steketee, 2014) and through a self-help 
book (Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 2007). These CBT treatments combine motivational 
interviewing strategies (Miller & Rollnick, 2012) with cognitive therapy techniques 
to target hoarding related beliefs, skills training to address decision making and other 
information processing difficulties, and exposure to acquisition cues and to 
discarding. Although only a small number of empirical investigations on these 
treatments have been conducted, a recent meta-analysis found large effect sizes for 
overall post-treatment improvement and specifically for difficulty discarding, 
Hedge’s g = .82 and .89, respectively (Tolin et al., 2015). However, the smallest 
effects across studies were found for functional impairment, Hedge’s g = .52, and less 
than half of participants achieved reliable and clinically significant change (Tolin et 
al., 2015). These relatively low response rates indicate a significant need for 
improvements in treatment strategies and the models on which they are based. An 
increased understanding of the role of moral reasoning, guilt, and shame in hoarding 
may contribute to such improvements.  
Scrupulosity 
Clinical Features 
Scrupulous OCD is characterized by obsessive fears and compulsions with 
religious or moral themes (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014; Nelson et al., 2006). 
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Common scrupulous obsessions include intrusive thoughts or images that are judged 
as sacrilegious, fears about having unintentionally violated religious laws, doubts 
about the sufficiency of one’s piety or morality, or fears that religious rituals have not 
been completely properly (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). Examples of compulsions 
that accompany these obsessions are excessive confession or prayer, mental acts 
meant to neutralize sinful thoughts, and checking or washing to avoid spiritual or 
moral contamination (Siev, Baer, & Minichiello, 2011). In addition to engaging in 
compulsions, scrupulous individuals often avoid situations, people, or places that 
elicit their obsessions such as places of worship, objects and texts related to religion, 
or materials perceived as sinful (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). In some presentations 
of scrupulosity, the topography of symptoms overlaps with common subtypes of 
OCD, but the ultimate feared consequences of obsessions are religious or moral 
nature (Huppert, Siev, & Kushner, 2007). For example, a person with contamination 
OCD might wash their hands repeatedly out of a fear of disease and death, whereas a 
person with scrupulous OCD might wash their hands repeatedly to prevent divine 
retribution for praying without being sufficiently clean.  
Scrupulosity can be distinguished from normative religious practice in a 
number of ways. Although the specific content of scrupulous obsessions may or may 
not be congruent with conventional religious beliefs, scrupulous individuals react 
with intense guilt and anxiety to transgressions perceived as normal and easily 
pardonable by others within their religious community (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 
2014). Similarly, scrupulous compulsions usually go far beyond the prescriptions of 
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religious law or normal practice in terms of the frequency or effort at perfection with 
which they are performed (Himle, Chatters, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2011).  
Compared to individuals with other forms of OCD, scrupulous OCD sufferers 
do not appear to have more severe symptoms or to seek out psychotherapy treatment 
less frequently (Siev, Baer, et al., 2011). However, scrupulosity has been associated 
with other clinical characteristics that may present barriers to successful treatment, 
including greater levels of depression and anxiety (Nelson et al., 2006), lower insight, 
more perceptual disturbances, and more magical thinking compared to other OCD 
presentations (Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak, & Foa, 2001).  
Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Scrupulosity 
 Abramowitz and Jacoby (2014) articulated a cognitive-behavioral model of 
scrupulosity that builds on a generic model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985) and integrates 
research findings particular to symptoms with religious themes (see Figure 2). 
According to this model, most people experience occasional unwanted and intrusive 
thoughts that violate their sense of morality or contravene their religious beliefs, but 
they tend to regard these intrusions as insignificant or meaningless (Rachman & de 
Silva, 1978). However, for the scrupulous OCD sufferer, these unwanted thoughts are 
interpreted as sinful or immoral (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014).  These interpretations 
are often based in more general beliefs about the importance of thoughts, especially 
thought-action fusion: the belief that thinking something immoral is just as bad as 
acting immorally and that thinking about events make them more likely to occur 
(TAF; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). Additionally, negative  




Figure 2. Cognitive-behavioral model of scrupulosity (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2014). 
interpretations of intrusions may be difficult to refute because of a low tolerance for 
uncertainty – a trait observed in both OCD in general and scrupulosity in particular 
(Fergus & Rowatt, 2015; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003)  
When intrusive thoughts are viewed as sinful or immoral, they elicit fears of 
punishment, which in turn triggers anxiety, distress, guilt, and shame (Abramowitz & 
Jacoby, 2014). In an attempt to alleviate these negative emotions, scrupulous 
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individuals engage in various compulsions, avoidance, and neutralizing (Abramowitz 
& Jacoby, 2014). Although these compulsions may provide some short-term 
emotional relief, they also tend to reinforce beliefs about the importance of intrusive 
thoughts and the need for certainty, which makes negative interpretations of future 
intrusions more likely. Therefore, as in other types of OCD, the scrupulous individual 
becomes trapped in a negatively reinforced cycle of avoidance, obsession, and 
ritualistic behavior that ultimately causes significant long-term impairment and 
distress.  
Treatment for Scrupulosity  
 As with other forms of OCD, the first-line treatment for scrupulosity is 
CBT that integrates Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP) with cognitive therapy 
techniques (Huppert & Siev, 2010). Treatment goals include the weakening of 
maladaptive beliefs that are inconsistent with one’s religion, increasing tolerance for 
uncertainty, and reducing rituals, neutralizing strategies, and avoidance (Abramowitz 
& Jacoby, 2014). To accomplish these goals, therapists and patients collaborate to 
tailor ERP techniques specifically to the patient’s scrupulous presentation, including 
strategies to violate obsessional rules about what is sinful or immoral and to 
differentiate normal from pathological rituals (Huppert & Siev, 2010). Additionally, 
treatment may involve religious clergy in order to help patients recognize 
contradictions between their obsessional beliefs and mainstream religious teachings, 
as well as to advise clergy about teachings and behavior that may reinforce 
scrupulous symptoms (Huppert & Siev, 2010). Findings on the efficacy of CBT with 
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ERP for scrupulosity are mixed, with some studies indicating lower treatment 
response for scrupulous OCD (Mataix-Cols et al., 2002) and others showing no 
differences compared to other OCD subtypes (Siev, Baer, et al., 2011).  
Linking Hoarding and Scrupulosity 
 Although numerous researchers have identified similarities and differences 
between HD and OCD in general (Frost et al., 2012), few have examined more 
specific relationships between hoarding and scrupulosity. One reason for this lack of 
empirical attention may be that some studies of the clinical features and measurement 
of scrupulosity have reported weak and non-significant bivariate correlations between 
symptoms of hoarding and scrupulosity (Kaviani, Eskandari, & Ghavam, 2015; 
Olatunji, Abramowitz, Williams, Connolly, & Lohr, 2007), suggesting that there is no 
relationship to be further explored. However, these results may be misleading because 
the measurements of hoarding in these studies were conducted using the hoarding 
subscale of the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa et al., 2002), which 
contains only three items and has failed to consistently identify HD participants in in 
comparison with healthy and anxious controls (Frost et al., 2012). In contrast, Rowley 
et al. (2011) studied the relationships between scrupulosity, hoarding, and other OCD 
symptoms using the Saving Inventory – Revised (SI-R; Frost, Steketee, & Grisham, 
2004), a comprehensive and well-validated measure of hoarding symptoms (Frost et 
al., 2012). Using hierarchical multiple regression, they assessed for unique 
contributions to the prediction of scrupulosity by symptoms of panic, social anxiety, 
hoarding, and OCD while controlling for anxiety and depression (Rowley et al., 
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2011). Of these predictors, only hoarding and intrusive thoughts showed unique 
significant relationships with scrupulosity, β = .26 and β = .22, respectively (Rowley 
et al., 2011). 
  The Rowley et al. (2011) findings raise an interesting question: what shared 
qualities of hoarding and scrupulosity account for their statistical relationship? The 
most obvious possibilities are the obsessional preoccupation and ritualistic behavior 
that characterize these syndromes and the entire OCRD category (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Similarly, anxiety is a common feature across the 
OCRDs and both hoarding and scrupulosity are strongly associated with measures of 
anxiety (Nelson et al., 2006; Steketee & Frost, 2003). However, the analysis in 
Rowley et al. (2011) controlled for obsessive-compulsive symptoms and anxiety 
through the Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 
2010) and the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995), suggesting that hoarding and scrupulosity share features beyond anxiety, 
obsessive preoccupation, and compulsive behavior. Identifying these shared features 
would expand cognitive-behavioral models of both disorders and specify potentially 
important treatment targets.  
Guilt and Shame 
 One feature that is prominent in clinical and theoretical accounts of both 
hoarding and scrupulosity is the experience of intense guilt and shame (Abramowitz 
& Jacoby, 2014; Frost & Hartl, 1996; Steketee & Frost, 2013). In hoarding, guilt and 
shame often result from the perceived wasting or mistreatment of objects (Frost et al., 
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2012). In scrupulosity, these emotions often result from perceived violations of moral 
or religious rules or deficiencies in the performance of religious rituals (Abramowitz 
& Jacoby, 2014). Despite the qualitative descriptions of guilt and shame included in 
cognitive-behavioral models of hoarding and scrupulosity (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 
2014; Steketee & Frost, 2013) empirical examinations of their role in either disorder 
are rare. For example, Weingarden and Renshaw (2015) recently reviewed the role of 
shame in a number of OCRDs including HD, and they noted that shame has only be 
examined in relation to the way people who hoard feel about their symptoms, rather 
than on shame as an etiological or maintenance factor in the development of those 
symptoms. Similarly, guilt has been addressed in some research on OCD in general 
but not in scrupulous OCD in particular, and it has usually been measured through 
inferences about responses to moral dilemmas, rather than from direct and objective 
measurement of the emotion (e.g., Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). 
 Additionally, the treatment of guilt and shame in models of hoarding and 
scrupulosity rarely includes a discussion of the overlap and differences between these 
two emotions. Although many people use the terms guilt and shame interchangeably 
in everyday language, researchers generally conceptualize these as two distinct but 
related moral emotions (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). Both are characterized 
by distress in response to ethical or moral transgressions (Tangney & Dearing, 2003), 
but they are distinguished from each other in at least two ways. The first is referred to 
as the self-behavior distinction: guilt involves negative feelings arising from specific 
evaluations of one’s behavior, whereas shame involves negative feelings arising from 
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global evaluations of one’s self (Tangney & Dearing, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
Along these lines, guilt tends to motivate efforts to repair wrongdoing, such as 
apologizing or compensating for immoral behavior with altruistic actions. In contrast, 
shame tends to motivate withdrawal and avoidance (Tangney & Dearing, 2003). The 
second distinction between guilt and shame is based on whether moral transgressions 
occur in a public or private context. According to this view, guilt results from a 
private sense of having done something wrong, whereas shame results from public 
exposure of wrongdoing (Combs, Campbell, Jackson, & Smith, 2010). Some models 
of moral emotions integrate both of these distinctions in the conceptualization and 
measurement of guilt and shame (Cohen et al., 2011). Overall, studies of 
psychopathology that employ these models of moral emotions suggest that poor 
psychological adjustment is more strongly associated with shame than with guilt 
(Covert, Tangney, Maddux, & Heleno, 2003). However, these models have not been 
applied specifically to hoarding or scrupulosity.  
Moralistic Thinking 
Identifying the ways in which guilt and shame might function in cognitive-
behavioral models of hoarding and scrupulosity requires an understanding of how 
these emotional responses relate to cognitive processes. In current models of each 
disorder, durable and generalized beliefs lead to maladaptive negative interpretations 
of specific situations, which results in distressing emotions. It follows that 
generalized beliefs about morality would lead to negative moral interpretations of 
situations, resulting in the emotions of guilt and shame. Therefore, understanding the 
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moral beliefs and moral reasoning processes associated with hoarding and 
scrupulosity would help to explain why moral emotions play such an important role 
in both disorders. 
Clinical descriptions of people with HD and scrupulous OCD often refer to 
rigid, dichotomous thinking about moral matters. For example, Frost and Steketee 
(2010) described the case of Anita, for whom wasting possessions was considered a 
moral transgression regardless of the condition or usefulness of the possession and 
despite the intense practical and emotional consequences of her hoarding. Similarly, 
people with scrupulous OCD have frequently been described as rigidly adhering to 
rules and beliefs about what is immoral or sinful, regardless of contextual or 
situational factors that many people would consider relevant to moral judgments 
(Nelson et al., 2006). These clinical descriptions suggest that hoarding and 
scrupulosity might be linked by a belief system and thinking style that includes a 
rigid, dichotomous, and rule-adherent approach to matters of morality. In the current 
study, this belief system and thinking style are collectively referred to as moralistic 
thinking.  
To date, no published empirical studies have objectively assessed moralistic 
thinking in hoarding or scrupulosity, though several studies have examined moral 
reasoning in OCD more generally (e.g., Franklin, McNally, & Riemann, 2009; 
Harrison et al., 2012; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Siev, Huppert, & Chambless, 2010; 
Whitton et al., 2014). All of these studies used moral dilemmas to assess moral 
reasoning, most frequently some variant of the trolley problem. In the basic version of 
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the trolley problem, a scenario is described in which a trolley car is running out of 
control towards five people who are stuck on its track but there is an alternate track 
on which only one person is stuck. Participants are asked to make an imaginary 
choice between doing nothing, thereby allowing the five people to die, or throwing a 
switch to change the trolley car’s path to the alternate track and thereby cause the 
death of one person. The trolley problem is a classical paradigm in philosophical 
discussions of morality and the two options are usually interpreted as distinguishing 
between the use of deontological and utilitarian moral reasoning. In deontological 
(from the Greek deon – “duty, or that which is binding”) reasoning, judgments about 
morality are based on the adherence of actions to rules or duties prescribed by a moral 
authority (Kant, 2002). Since most moral codes include an injunction against causing 
the death of others but not one requiring people to constantly prevent harm to others, 
deciding not to intervene in the path of the trolley is considered a deontological 
choice. In contrast, utilitarian moral reasoning involves judging the morality of 
actions based on the principle of maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering for 
the greatest number of people (Mill, 1901). Following this principle requires trolley 
problem participants to violate the moral injunction against causing the death of 
another in order to save the maximum number of people.  
In applying this paradigm to the study of moral reasoning in OCD, Mancini 
and Gangemi (2015) found that OCD was related to a preference for the 
deontological over the utilitarian choice. The authors interpreted this effect as an 
indication that people with OCD adhere to the moral rule of “do not play god” 
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(Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). Using the trolley problem and similar moral dilemmas, 
Whitton et al. (2014), also found that preference for the deontological option was 
associated with OCD, as well as with reduced performance on neuropsychological 
measures of cognitive control. Whitton et al. (2014) interpreted these results as 
evidence of moral rigidity in OCD.  
This interpretation is informed by contemporary theories of moral reasoning 
that highlight the dual roles of cognitive and affective processes in moral decision-
making (Haidt, 2001). According to these theories, moral reasoning is strongly 
influenced by rapid, automatic emotional responses. These emotions are shaped by 
evolutionary and cultural forces, and they are experienced as intuitive judgments 
about morality (Haidt, 2001). Alongside this affective process, the slower cognitive 
processes of interpretation and rational deliberation take place and serve the function 
of corroborating or overriding intuitive judgments (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, 
& Cohen, 2004). Within this theoretical approach, deontological choices in the trolley 
problem are thought to indicate the dominance of emotional reactions to causing the 
death of another person, whereas utilitarian preferences are attributed to the 
overriding of these affective responses through cognitive deliberation about the 
relative moral value of killing one to save five (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene et al., 2004).  Based on this theory, the moral 
rigidity described by Whitton et al. (2014) suggests that people with OCD display a 
reduced ability to use cognitive deliberation to overcome their intuitive emotional 
response to the idea of causing harm. Currently, no published studies have examined 
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whether this type of moral rigidity or a belief in the importance of rules specifically 
characterizes scrupulous OCD. Similarly, no published studies have examined the 
possible role of these processes in hoarding.  
Cognitive Rigidity  
 If hoarding and scrupulosity are associated with rigid moralistic thinking, it is 
possible that this moral rigidity is embedded in a more general cognitive rigidity that 
influences multiple belief domains. In fact, an association between these conditions 
and cognitive rigidity is suggested by data indicating high rates of comorbidity of 
each disorder with OCPD (MataixCols et al., 2000; Siev, Steketee, et al., 2011). 
People with OCPD traits attempt to maintain a sense of control through order and 
perfection, a painstaking adherence to rules and procedures, and a generalized pattern 
of cognitive and behavioral rigidity (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 
addition to this general cognitive rigidity, people with OCPD traits are often 
particularly rigid in their thinking about moral matters (Beck, Davis, & Freeman, 
2015). They tend to think in dichotomous terms about morality and to adhere to strict 
rules about right and wrong in order to simplify the complexity of reality (Kyrios, 
1998). Therefore, it is possible that the comorbidity of OCPD with both hoarding and 
scrupulosity is the result of both moral and general cognitive rigidity in these 
disorders. 
One area of concern when making inferences based on comorbidity rates 
between hoarding, scrupulosity, and OCPD is that the DSM-5 criteria for OCPD 
include being scrupulous about matters of morality and an inability to discard 
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worthless or worn-out objects (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This overlap 
in diagnostic criteria with HD and OCD confounds correlations between these 
diagnoses. However, in some studies in which these problematic criteria have been 
removed from comorbidity analyses, both hoarding and scrupulosity have remained 
significantly associated with the remaining OCPD criteria (MataixCols et al., 2000; 
Samuels et al., 2007; Siev, Steketee, et al., 2011). These findings suggest that 
hoarding and scrupulosity share the overall rigid characteristics of OCPD above and 
beyond specific hoarding or scrupulous behavior.  
Empirical examinations of cognitive rigidity in hoarding and scrupulosity 
have mostly employed neuropsychological tasks that tap elements of cognitive 
flexibility such as set shifting and decision-making, and results have been mixed 
(Mataix-Cols, Pertusa, & Snowdon, 2011).  For example, McMillan, Rees, and Pestell 
(2013) found that hoarding participants made more perseveration errors and 
completed fewer categories on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) compared 
to population norms, but at least two other studies have found no differences in 
WCST performances between hoarding and control participants (N. S. Lawrence et 
al., 2006; Tolin, Villavicencio, Umbach, & Kurtz, 2011). Additionally, de Kort 
(2012) found evidence of reduced cognitive flexibility in hoarding participants on the 
final trial of the Stroop task but not on the Intra-Extra Dimensional Set-Shifting task. 
Similarly, although several studies have found deficits in cognitive flexibility in OCD 
in general (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006; Gu et al., 
2007; Veale, Sahakian, Owen, & Marks, 1996), Rasmussen, Siev, Abramovitch, and 
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Wilhelm (2016) failed to find evidence of such deficits specifically in scrupulous 
OCD. One significant limitation to all of these studies is that the neuropsychological 
tasks they employ involve numerous basic cognitive processes, which complicates 
interpretations of task performance (Woody et al., 2014). Moreover, these measures 
of basic cognitive processes like set-switching and pattern detection seem only 
weakly related to the theoretical construct of cognitive flexibility as a personality trait 
or thinking style. It is therefore not clear if neuropsychological research really 
addresses the type of cognitive rigidity that characterizes OCPD and that may 
contribute to the connection between hoarding and scrupulosity.  
Summary  
 HD and scrupulous OCD are two debilitating conditions that are part of the 
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) category of Obsessive-Compulsive 
and Related Disorders. This category is closely related to the anxiety disorders 
category, and it includes disorders characterized by obsessional preoccupation and 
ritualistic behavior (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, prior 
research has found a statistical relationship between hoarding and scrupulosity after 
controlling for these common factors, suggesting that they share other factors beyond 
those shared by the entire group of OCRDs. Clinical accounts of hoarding and 
scrupulosity, along with a limited body of empirical research, suggest that the 
relationship between these two conditions may be partly explained by three shared 
factors: a tendency to experience intense guilt and shame, rigid moralistic thinking, 
and general cognitive rigidity. 
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Aims of the Present Study 
 Therefore, the current study was designed to achieve three aims:  
1) Substantiate the relationship between hoarding and scrupulosity by replicating 
previous research findings showing a correlation between the two when 
controlling for symptoms of OCD, anxiety, and depression; 
2) Test the hypothesis that this relationship is explained by the mutual effects of 
guilt and shame, rigid moralistic thinking, and cognitive rigidity on both 
disorders; and, 
3) Refine this explanatory model through post-hoc and exploratory analyses of 
other indicators of moral reasoning and moral emotions.  
 






 285 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
website, and 195 participants were included in the final sample. The mean age of 
participants was 40.62 years with a standard deviation of 11.5 years. The sample was 
55.6% female, and predominantly white (82.7%), not Hispanic or Latino/a (93.9%), 
and heterosexual (93.4%). The religious category most frequently endorsed was no 
religion (42.9%), followed by Protestant (28.1%) and Catholic (18.4%). In terms of 
reported education level, 87.2% of participants reported at least some college 
education. All sample characteristics are listed in Table 1 on the following page.  
Measures 
Symptom Measures 
Savings Inventory – Revised (SI-R; Frost et al., 2004). The SI-R is a 23-item 
self-report measure designed to assess symptoms of hoarding. The SI-R has three 
subscales, corresponding to the primary symptoms of hoarding disorder:  difficulty 
discarding, excessive clutter, and excessive acquisition (Frost et al., 2004). Total and 
subscale scores have demonstrated strong internal consistency (α = .87 - .92) and the 
ability to discriminate hoarding samples from both non-hoarding OCD and non-
clinical controls groups (Frost et al., 2004).  
  




 Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic  Mean SD 
Age  40.62 11.5 
Characteristic  n % 
Gender Male 85 43.4 
 Female 109 55.6 
 Other 2 1.0 
Race White 162 82.7 
 African-American 15 7.7 
 Asian/Asian-American 12 6.2 
 American-Indian 2 1.0 
 Other 5 2.6 
Ethnicity Not Hispanic or Latino/a 184 93.9 
 Hispanic or Latino/a 12 6.1 
Religion No religion 84 42.9 
 Protestant 55 28.1 
 Catholic 36 18.4 
 Other religion 13 6.6 
 Jewish 4 2.0 
 Buddhist 3 1.5 
 Muslim 1 0.5 
Education High School 25 12.8 
 Some college 76 38.8 
 College degree 83 42.3 
 Graduate degree 12 6.1 
Sexual Orientation Straight/Heterosexual 183 93.4 
 Pansexual 4 2.0 
 Bisexual 4 2.0 
 Asexual 2 1.0 
 Gay 1 .5 
 Lesbian 1 .5 
 Queer 1 .5 
Note. N = 196.    
  
LINKING HOARDING AND SCRUPULOSITY 
 
30 
Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity (Abramowitz, Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, & 
Cahill, 2002). The PIOS is a 19-item self-report measure of scrupulosity.  It includes 
two subscales, the Fear of God scale and the Fear of Immorality subscale. The PIOS 
total and subscale scores have demonstrated excellent internal reliability in previous 
studies (αs = .94  – .97), and total scores reliably discriminate patients with symptoms 
of scrupulous OCD from patients with other OCD features and anxiety disorders 
(Huppert & Fradkin, 2015). 
Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010). 
The DOCS is a 20-item self-report measure that assesses the severity of four OCD 
symptom dimensions: contamination, responsibility for harm and mistakes, 
symmetry/ordering, and unacceptable thoughts. The DOCS has demonstrated strong 
internal consistency in all subscales (αs = .94 – .96) and adequate test-retest reliability 
(rs = .55 – .66). The DOCS also demonstrated convergence with other well-validated 
OCD measures (Abramowitz et al., 2010). 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale –21 (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 
2005). The DASS-21 is 21-item self-report measure that includes three 7-item scales 
that measure depression, anxiety, and stress. The DASS-21 has demonstrated good 
internal reliability (αs = .82 – .93) and good convergent and discriminant validity 
when compared with other validated measures of depression and anxiety (Henry & 
Crawford, 2005). 
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Moral Reasoning Measures 
The Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler & Jones, 1992). The GI is a 45-item self-
report measure of the tendency to experience guilt and shame. The inventory includes 
three subscales: trait guilt, state guilt, and moral standards. These scales have 
demonstrated good internal reliability and temporal stability, as well as good 
convergent and discriminant validity in relation to other measures of guilt and related 
constructs (Kugler & Jones, 1992; Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, & Felton, 2010). 
According to the authors of the Guilt Inventory, the moral standards subscale was 
intended to measure the “readiness to experience guilt on the basis of the strength of 
one’s moral values” (Kugler & Jones, 1992, p. 319). It was therefore used in the 
current study as one of several variables measuring moral reasoning. However, 
inspection of the item content of the moral standards scale suggested that only five of 
the fifteen items in the scale appeared consistent with our theoretical construct of the 
rigid and dichotomous moral reasoning hypothesized to contribute to hoarding and 
scrupulosity. Therefore, we used these five items to construct a new scale that we 
titled Moral Rigidity and we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the 
extent to which these five items loaded on a single latent variable (see Appendix 2 for 
items). In the initial CFA, all items showed acceptable factor loadings (range .64 – 
.71) but the chi-square test for the overall model indicated a lack of fit between the 
model and the data, Χ2(5) = 46.02, p < .001. Examination of modification indices 
showed that this lack of fit was largely affected by a correlation between the error 
terms associated with items 8 and 12. When this correlation was included in a second 
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CFA, the chi-square test indicated good model fit, Χ2(4) = 3.52, p = .48. The internal 
reliability of the Moral Rigidity scale was corroborated by calculating Cronbach’s 
alpha, which indicated good internal consistency (α = .86). 
Moral Orientation Scale (MOS; Conway, Love, & Mottner, 2016). The MOS 
is a 28-item self-report instrument designed to assess how people process moral 
judgments. The MOS measures four orientations about moral or ethical matters. The 
Affective Orientation scale (MOS Affective) measures the tendency to experience 
strong negative emotions in response the immoral behavior of others. The 
Deliberative Orientation scale (MOS Deliberative) measures beliefs and attitudes 
about resolving ethical matters through a problem-solving, context-dependent 
process. The Rule Orientation scale (MOS Rule) measures the attitude that moral 
matters should be resolved through adherence to rules. Lastly, the Sentimental 
Orientation scale (MOS Sentiment) measures a tendency to “follow one’s heart” 
rather than logic in matters of morality. In a study of moral dilemmas, Conway et al. 
(2016) found that these scales demonstrated good internal consistency (αs = .76-.87), 
as well as good convergent and discriminant validity.  
Moral Emotion Measures 
The Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al., 2011). The GASP is a 
16-item self-report measure that assesses the propensity to feel guilt and shame across 
a variety of personal transgressions. The GASP contains two guilt subscales: 
Negative Behavior Evaluation (GASP NBE), which measures evaluations of one’s 
behavior as wrong, and Repair (GASP Repair), which measures the tendency to 
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attempt to repair situations after a perceived moral transgression. The GASP also 
contains two shame scales: Negative Self Evaluation (GASP NSE), which measures 
evaluations of oneself as bad or immoral, and Withdraw (GASP Withdraw), which 
measures the tendency to withdraw from situations after a perceived moral 
transgression. These GASP subscales have demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency (αs = .62 – .71) and convergence with other measures of guilt and shame 
(Cohen et al., 2011). 
Anticipated Guilt (AG; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). The AG is a 10-
item self-report measure in which participants rate their expected reactions to a 
hypothetical moral transgression, which involves the participant receiving too much 
change at a retail store and keeping the money instead of returning it. In terms of the 
self-behavior distinction between guilt and shame, the AG contains items consistent 
with both emotions. For example, the statement “I would feel like undoing what I 
have done” relates to guilt about one’s behavior, and the statement “I would feel like 
punishing myself” relates to shame about one’s self. The AG has demonstrated good 
internal consistency (Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2006) and good construct validity 
(Roseman et al., 1994) in previous research.  
Cognitive Flexibility Measures 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin & Rubin, 1995). The CFS is a 12-
item self-report measure of cognitive flexibility. It has demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency (α = .77) and good one-week test-retest reliability (r = .83), as well as  
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good convergent and discriminant validity when compared to measures of 
communication flexibility and attitude rigidity (Martin & Rubin, 1995). 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI; Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). The CFI 
is a 20-item self-report instrument developed to measure the type of cognitive 
flexibility thought to be involved in challenging and modifying maladaptive 
cognitions in cognitive therapy. It contains two subscales: Control, measuring the 
tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable, and Alternative, the ability to 
perceive alternative viewpoints and generate alternative solutions to problems. These 
factors demonstrated excellent internal consistency (αs = .84-.91) and temporal 
stability in the CFI’s 7-week development study (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010).   
Procedures  
 The opportunity to participate in the study was advertised as a task on MTurk 
and made available to all registered MTurk workers who were at least 18 years old 
and located in the United States. Interested workers followed a hyperlink to Nova 
Southeastern University’s Redcap system website, where they were presented with 
the informed consent form. If they provided consent, they were presented with the 
study survey. Each instrument was presented on a separate web page, and pages were 
designed to look virtually identical to the paper forms of the instruments. If 
participants reached the end of an instrument without responding to all items, they 
were notified and encouraged to complete the instrument, but they were not stopped 
from submitting the incomplete form and moving to the next instrument. Participants 
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who submitted all instruments received a completion code, which they entered in 
their MTurk account to receive a $4.00 payment for their participation.  
Data Analysis Strategies 
 The primary analysis of the study was conducted using structural equation 
modeling (SEM). SEM allowed us to construct latent variables with multiple 
indicators for each of the hypothesized predictors, as well as to estimate their 
regression coefficients when two outcome variables were regressed on the predictors 
simultaneously. The specified model of our primary hypothesis also allowed for the 
estimation of the partial correlation between our two outcomes (Preacher, 2006), 
which we used to assess the extent to which the observed relationship between these 
two variables were explained by the predictors (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 
2000). The final model in the post-hoc analysis was tested in a similar fashion, but 
employed only observed indicators and no latent variables. All SEM analyses were 
conducted in SPSS AMOS Version 21 using maximum likelihood estimation. 
Additionally, correlational and regression analyses were conducted using SPSS 
Version 20. 






The study survey included five attention check items (e.g., “Please answer 3 to this 
item”) to help identify patterns of random responding. Participants who incorrectly 
responded to any of the five attention check items, as well as those who failed to 
complete 90% of all measures, were excluded from the analyses. Additionally, we 
calculated the total time taken to complete the entire study survey in order to assess 
the extent to which participants appeared actively engaged in the study. Although 
most participants completed the study in an appropriate amount of time (Mean = 56.6 
minutes, SD = 74.2 minutes), some participants’ completion times were too small to 
indicate real engagement (minimum time to completion was 3.5 minutes for 324 
items). Therefore, we examined internal consistency on a number of study measures 
separately for participants who completed the study in under 30 minutes and under 20 
minutes. No decrements in internal consistency were noted for the under 30 minutes 
group, but Cronbach’s alphas for the under 20 minute group were noticeable lower on 
several measures. We therefore also excluded participants who completed the study in 
under 20 minutes, resulting in a final sample size of N = 196. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 below lists the minimum and maximum scores, mean, standard 
deviation, skew, kurtosis, and internal consistency statistics for every study measure. 
All measures demonstrated adequate to excellent internal consistency (αs = .72 – 96). 
LINKING HOARDING AND SCRUPULOSITY 
 
37 
No distributions displayed large departures from normality in terms of skewness 
(Skew = -1.47 – 1.94), though some distributions showed large kurtosis values 
(kurtosis = -0.44 – 4.20). A correlation matrix including all study variables is 
displayed in Table 3. 
Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics for all study variables. 
 
Var. Min Max Mean SD Skew Kurtosis α 
SIR 0 71 23.86 16.23 0.58 -0.44 .92 
PIOS 0 69 11.98 13.78 1.44 1.95 .96 
DASS-21 0 57 14.98 13.66 0.92 -0.04 .96 
DOCS Contamination 0 15 2.72 3.16 1.39 1.85 .91 
DOCS Harm 0 17 2.88 3.64 1.41 1.80 .94 
DOCS Intrusive Thoughts 0 15 2.93 3.42 1.08 0.45 .92 
DOCS Symmetry 0 15 2.09 3.05 1.94 4.20 .93 
GI Moral Standards 15 74 44.44 10.19 0.13 0.90 .85 
Moral Rigidity 5 25 16.52 4.54 -0.16 -0.19 .86 
MOS Rule 7 49 28.65 7.76 0.29 -0.08 .86 
MOS Affective 15 49 39.58 6.63 -1.03 1.46 .88 
MOS Deliberative 7 49 36.95 5.81 -0.99 3.48 .79 
MOS Sentiment 9 49 29.34 8.79 -0.21 -0.59 .93 
Anticipated Guilt 10 50 32.53 11.72 -0.32 -0.99 .95 
GASP NBE 4 28 22.50 4.79 -1.03 0.78 .74 
GASP Repair 4 28 23.27 4.19 -1.34 3.02 .77 
GASP NSE 4 28 23.06 4.58 -1.47 2.81 .80 
GASP Withdraw 4 26 11.81 5.03 0.58 -0.25 .70 
CFS 29 72 55.60 8.51 -0.30 -0.08 .87 
CFI 59 126 96.70 10.02 -0.40 1.16 .72 
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Replicating the Unique Relationship Between Hoarding and Scrupulosity 
 As a first step in examining the relationship between hoarding and 
scrupulosity, we sought to replicate previous findings showing that hoarding 
symptoms predicted scrupulosity after controlling for symptoms of OCD, anxiety, 
and depression (Rowley et al., 2011).  We conducted a multiple regression analysis 
with the PIOS as the dependent variable and the four DOCS scales, the SI-R, and the 
DASS-21 as predictor variables. Results of this analysis are listed in Table 4 below.  
Table 4 
Prediction of Scrupulosity  by Hoarding, OCD, Anxiety, and Depression 
Var. B SE β t p sr2 
DASS-21 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.25 .80 <.01 
DOCS Contamination 0.17 0.33 0.04 0.51 .61 <.01 
DOCS Harm -0.49 0.30 -0.13 -1.63 .11 <.01 
DOCS Intrusive Thoughts 2.01 0.29 0.50 6.89 <.001 .14 
DOCS Symmetry 0.26 0.32 0.06 0.79 .43 <.01 
SI-R 0.22 0.06 0.26 3.53 .001 .04 
Note. For full model, F (6,189) = 22.68, p < .001, R2 = .42.   
Not surprisingly, the complete set of independent variables significantly predicted the 
PIOS, F(6,189) = 22.68, p < .001, R2 = .42.  Individually, only the DOCS Intrusive 
Thoughts subscale and the SI-R were uniquely related to the PIOS when controlling 
for other predictors (β = .50, p < .001, sr2 = .14 for DOCS intrusive thoughts and β = 
.26, p = .001, sr2 = .04 for SI-R). These results are nearly identical to those found in 
Rowley et al. (2011) and therefore provide additional support to the proposition that 
hoarding and scrupulosity share unique features above and beyond obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and anxiety. 
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Test of Hypothesized Three-Factor Model 
 We tested our initial hypothesis about the relationship between hoarding and 
scrupulosity using SEM. The specified model consisted of three correlated latent 
factors, with each factor connected to both hoarding (i.e., SI-R) and scrupulosity (i.e., 
PIOS) by direct causal paths. The first factor, Moralistic Thinking, was composed of 
two observed variables, Moral Rigidity and the MOS rule orientation subscale. All 
four GASP subscales and the Anticipated Guilt scale loaded on the second factor, 
Guilt and Shame. Finally, cognitive rigidity was represented by low scores on the 
Cognitive Flexibility factor, composed of the CFS and the CFI. The path diagram for 
the model with estimated standardized path coefficients is presented in Figure 3 
below.  
 
Figure 3. Structural equation model of the relationship between hoarding and 
scrupulosity, controlling for Moralistic Thinking, Guilt and Shame, and Cognitive 
Flexibility.  
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 The minimum fit function chi-square for the hypothesized model was 
statistically significant, Χ2(36) = 123.09, p < .001, indicating poor model fit. This lack 
of fit was corroborated by inspection of model fit indices. The GFI (.90) failed to 
meet the recommended threshold of greater than or equal to .95 (Shevlin & Miles, 
1998). The CFI (.90) was also below the recommended cutoff of .95 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). Finally, the RMSEA (.11) exceeded the recognized upper limit of .07 (Steiger, 
2007). Examination of the regression weights of the three latent factors with the SIR 
and the PIOS (listed in Table 5 below) showed that the poor model fit was 
attributable to the fact that only one latent factor, Cognitive Flexibility, had 
significant effects on the dependent variables. In contrast, the Guilt and Shame and  
Moralistic Thinking factors were associated neither with hoarding nor scrupulosity. 
Additionally, the coefficients for the paths between these two factors and their 
respective observed indicators suggest problems in the measurement of the latent 
factors themselves. For the Moralistic Thinking factor, the standardized loading of the 
moral rigidity variable was weak and negative (-.31), whereas the MOS rule loading 
was positive (1.27) and associated with a negative error variance, indicating that the 
two variables did not load together on a coherent or meaningful latent factor. For the 
Guilt and Shame factor, four of the five observed indicators had acceptable factor 
loadings (.69 – .94), but the GASP withdraw subscale did not load (.07) on the latent 
variable. However, even when the GASP withdraw subscale was dropped from the 
model, the relationships between the latent Guilt and Shame factor and the dependent 
variables did not improve. Therefore, unlike the Moralistic Thinking factor, the Guilt 
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and Shame factor represented a coherent construct, but one that was not associated 
with hoarding or scrupulosity.  
Table 5 
Regression Weights and p-values for Factors in Hypothesized Model 
 SI-R  PIOS 
Var. B SE p β  B SE p β 
Moralistic Thinking .04 .09 .69 0.02  .18 .20 .39 0.13 
Guilt and Shame 6.47 7.47 .39 0.14  7.06 7.92 .37 0.18 
Cognitive Flexibility -.44 .08 <.001 -0.41  -.32 .06 <.001 -0.35 
Note. N = 196.  
Taken together, the results of the SEM analysis supported only one of three 
aspects of our initial hypothesis. Consistent with our predictions, cognitive rigidity 
(i.e. low cognitive flexibility) was associated with both hoarding and scrupulosity. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, the combination of guilt and shame did not significantly 
predicted either disorder. Moralistic thinking was also not associated with the 
dependent variables, but the lack of coherence in the factor’s measurement model 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions about this result.  
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 In order to improve our explanatory model, we ran a series of post-hoc 
analyses, beginning with an inspection of bivariate correlations to identify individual 
predictor variables that correlated significantly with both hoarding and scrupulosity. 
These identified predictors were then entered together into multiple regression 
analyses of each dependent variable to assess their contributions when controlling for 
each other. Next, variables that contributed unique variance in both multiple 
regression analyses were entered in a single partial correlation analysis using SEM to 
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assess their simultaneous effects on hoarding and scrupulosity. Finally, the specificity 
of these effects to hoarding and scrupulosity was examined by regressing other OCD 
symptom measures on the same set of predictors.  
Bivariate Correlations 
As a first step in identifying shared factors, we examined bivariate 
correlations between the two outcomes and 13 potential predictors across three 
domains: moral reasoning, moral emotions, and cognitive flexibility. Moral reasoning 
variables included the Moral Standards subscale of the Guilt Inventory (Kugler & 
Jones, 1992), the Moral Rigidity scale we constructed from a subset of Moral 
Standards items, and the four moral orientation subscales from the Moral Orientation 
Scale (Conway et al., 2016). Moral emotion variables included the Anticipated Guilt 
scale (Roseman et al., 1994) and the four subscales of the GASP (Cohen et al., 2011). 
Cognitive flexibility variables included both the CFS and the CFI.  
Pearson correlational coefficients for each variable with the SI-R and the 
PIOS are listed in Table 6 below. Five of the 13 predictors demonstrated significant 
bivariate correlations with both outcomes. Contrary to the initial hypothesis of our 
study, the MOS Rule Orientation subscale correlated with only the PIOS and moral 
rigidity did not correlate with either dependent variable. Within the remaining 
indicators of moral reasoning, only the MOS Sentimental subscale significantly 
predicted both hoarding, r(196) = .20, p = .005, and scrupulosity, r(196) = .26, p < 
.001. Additionally, the MOS Deliberative subscale was significantly and negatively 
 





Bivariate Correlations between 13 Predictors and 2 Outcomes 
Variable SI-R PIOS 
GI Moral Standards .01 -.10 
Moral Rigidity -.03 -.07 
MOS Rule .05 .19** 
MOS Affective .14* -.04 
MOS Deliberative -.13 -.19** 
MOS Sentiment .20** .26** 
Anticipated Guilt .15* .23** 
GASP NBE .11 .16* 
GASP Repair -.05 .01 
GASP NSE .09 .12 
GASP Withdraw .22** .28** 
CFS -.34** -.33** 
CFI -.39** -.30** 
Note. N = 196.  
*p<.05, **p<.01 
related to scrupulosity, r(196) = -.19, p = .009 and approached a significant negative 
relationship with hoarding, r(196) = -.13, p = .08. Two emotional predictors were 
related to both outcomes: Anticipated Guilt (with SI-R, r(196) = .15, p = .04; with 
PIOS r(196) = .23, p = .001) and GASP Withdraw (with SI-R, r(196) = .22, p = .002; 
with PIOS r(196) = .28, p < .001). Finally, both cognitive flexibility measures were 
significantly and negatively related to the SIR and the PIOS (CFS with SI-R, r(196) = 
-.34, p < .001, with PIOS, r(196) = -.33, p < .001; CFI with SI-R, r(196) = -.39, p < 
.001, with PIOS, r(196) = -.30, p < .001). 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
 In the next step of refining our model, we conducted multiple regression 
analyses for each outcome using the set of five predictors that showed significant 
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bivariate relationships with both the SI-R and the PIOS. However, in the first run of 
these analyses, the CFS and the CFI, which were strongly correlated with each other 
in the bivariate analyses (r = .83) and appeared to overlap considerably in terms of 
item content, demonstrated a moderate level of multicollinearity (Variance Inflation 
Factors = 3.3 for each), suggesting the use of both variables in the model was 
redundant. Of the two measures, the CFS has a simpler factor structure and more well 
established psychometric properties. Therefore, the CFS was retained and the CFI 
was dropped from the model, leaving the MOS Sentiment, Anticipated Guilt, GASP 
Withdraw, and the CFS as predictors of hoarding and scrupulosity. Regression 
diagnostics indicated that no observations exerted excessive influence on model fit or 
individual parameter estimations. However, the assumption of homoscedasticity was 
not tenable for the analysis with the PIOS as the outcome. This issue is further 
addressed in the discussion of study limitations. The results of the two analyses are 
listed below in Table 7. 
Table 7. 
Multiple Regression Analyses of Four Predictors of the SI-R and PIOS 
DV SI-R  PIOS 
R2 .17  .23 
F 9.71**  13.85** 
Var. B SE β p sr2  B SE β p sr2 
MOS S 0.29 .12 0.16 .02 .02  0.33 .10 0.21 .002 .04 
AG 0.18 .09 0.13 .05 .02  0.24 .08 0.20 .002 .04 
GASP W 0.18 .24 0.06 .45 .<.01  0.35 .19 0.13 .07 .01 
CFS -0.59 .14 -0.31 <.001 .08  -0.43 .11 -0.27 <.001 .06 
Note. N = 196. MOS S = MOS Sentimental Orientation. AG = Anticipated Guilt. 
GASP W = GASP Withdraw.  
**p<.01  
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As a set, the four predictors significantly predicted both the SI-R, F(4,191) = 
9.71, p < .001, R2 = .17, and the PIOS, F(4,191) = 13.85, p < .001, R2 = .23. In terms 
of unique contributions, three variables remained significantly related to both 
outcomes when controlling for the other predictors: MOS Sentiment, Anticipated 
Guilt, and the CFS.  The CFS demonstrated the strongest effect on both the SIR, β = -
0.31, p < .001, sr2 = .08, and the PIOS, β = -0.27, p < .001, sr2 = .06. The MOS 
Sentiment had small, significant effects on both outcomes, β = 0.16, p = .02, sr2 = .02, 
β = 0.21, p = .002, sr2 = .04, as did Anticipated Guilt, β = 0.13, p = .05, sr2 = .02, and 
β = 0.20, p = .002, sr2 = .04, for the SI-R and PIOS, respectively. In contrast, the 
GASP Withdraw scale no longer showed significant relationships with the SI-R, β = 
0.06, p = .45, sr2 = .003, or PIOS, β = 0.13, p = .07, sr2 = .01 when controlling for the 
other predictors.  
Partial Correlation 
 Next, the three predictors that contributed significant unique variance to both 
dependent variables in the two separate multiple regression analyses were entered 
into a structural equation model similar to our original SEM analysis. However, in 
this new, simpler model, the three observed variables were connected directly to the 
dependent variables via causal paths, rather than loading onto latent factors. This 
allowed us to estimate their effects on hoarding and scrupulosity simultaneously, as 
compared to the separate analyses we conducted using multiple regression. The path 
diagram for this model with estimated parameters is shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4. Structural equation model of the relationship between hoarding and 
scrupulosity, controlling for MOS Sentiment, Anticipated Guilt, and Cognitive 
Flexibility. 
 
 Because this model is saturated, estimates of overall model fit were not 
calculable. In terms of the individual predictors, inspection of the standardized 
regression coefficients (listed in Table 8 below) showed that all three variables 
significantly predicted both outcomes. 
Table 8 
Regression Weights and p-values for Final Model 
 SI-R  PIOS 
Var. B SE p β  B SE p β 
MOS Sentiment .30 .12 .01 0.16  .35 .10 <.001 0.22 
Anticipated Guilt .19 .09 .04 0.14  .25 .08 <.001 0.22 
Cognitive Flexibility -.64 .13 <.001 -0.33  -.52 .10 <.001 -0.32 
Note. N = 196.  
In addition to inspecting the individual predictors, we calculated the partial 
correlation between the SI-R and PIOS when controlling for the set of predictors by 
estimating the correlation between the residual terms of the two outcomes. The partial 
correlation was .36, compared to their bivariate correlation of .48. These are 
equivalent to squared correlational coefficients of .13 and .23, respectively, or a 44% 
decrease in variance in one outcome accounted for by the other, indicating that the 
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combined influence of the MOS Sentiment, Anticipated Guilt, and CFS explained a 
considerable portion of the relationship between the SI-R and PIOS. However, the 
partial correlation of .36 between hoarding and scrupulosity remained statistically 
significant (p <.001), suggesting that part of this relationship remains unexplained. 
Specificity to Hoarding and Scrupulosity 
 In the final step in our analyses, we evaluated the specificity of the effects of 
the MOS Sentiment, Anticipated Guilt, and CFS measures by testing their 
relationships with other types of OCD besides scrupulosity. Four separate multiple 
regression analyses were conducted with a different DOCS scale as the dependent 
variables in each analysis. The results of these analyses are listed in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 
Multiple Regression Analyses with DOCS Scales as Dependent Variables 
DV Var. B SE β p sr2 
Contamination MOS S 0.05 0.03 0.15 .04 .02 
 AG <0.001 0.02 <0.001 .99 <.01 
 CFS -0.06 0.03 -0.15 .03 .02 
  
Harm MOS S 0.01 0.03 0.02 .82 <.01 
 AG 0.05 0.02 0.16 .02 .02 
 CFS -0.14 0.03 -0.33 <.001 .11 
  
Thoughts MOS S 0.06 0.03 0.25 .03 .02 
 AG 0.03 0.02 0.12 .08 .01 
 CFS -0.12 0.03 -0.30 <.001 .09 
  
Symmetry MOS S 0.02 0.02 0.06 .37 <.01 
 AG 0.04 0.02 0.15 .04 .02 
 CFS -0.06 0.03 -0.20 .02 .03 
Notes. For contamination: F(3,192) = 3.24, p = .02, R2 = .05; Harm: F(3,192) = 9.97, 
p < .001, R2 = .14; Thoughts: F(3,192) = 9.63, p < .001, R2 = .12; and Symmetry: 
F(3,192) = 3.78, p = .01, R2 = .06.  
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As a set, the three predictors significantly related to each of the DOCS scales (R2s = 
.05-.14, ps <.05). However, in contrast to the SI-R and PIOS, none of the DOCS 
scales were significantly related to all three individual predictors. The MOS sentiment 
scale was significantly related only to contamination and intrusive thoughts (β = 0.15, 
p = .04, sr2 = .02 and β = 0.25, p = .03, sr2 = .02, respectively). Anticipated guilt was 
significantly related to harm and symmetry, (β = 0.16, p = .02, sr2 = .02 and β = 0.15, 
p = .04, sr2 = .02, respectively), and approached a significant relationship with 
intrusive thoughts, β = 0.11, p = .08, sr2 = .01. Finally, the CFS was significantly 
related to all four DOCS scales, βs = -0.15 to -0.30, ps < .05, sr2s = .02 – .11. These 
results indicated that, although no individual predictor is specifically related only to 
hoarding and scrupulosity, the constellation of significant relationships with all three 
variables were only observed in these two conditions.  
 





 The main purpose of this investigation was to identify factors that explain the 
connection between hoarding and scrupulosity. In particular, we hypothesized that the 
relationship between these disorders would be explained by three shared factors: a 
tendency to experience intense guilt and shame, rigid moralistic thinking, and a larger 
pattern of general cognitive rigidity within which moralistic thinking is embedded. 
Our investigation was therefore conducted with the following aims: (1) to replicate 
previous findings showing a unique relationship between hoarding and scrupulosity 
when controlling for OCD, anxiety, and depression, (2) to determine if our 
hypothesized explanatory model was supported by the data, and (3) to refine this 
explanatory model through post-hoc analyses of related predictor variables. 
In the first step of our analyses, we found that hoarding and scrupulosity 
demonstrated a strong correlation that remained significant after controlling for 
symptoms of OCD, anxiety, and depression. This result replicates the findings of 
Rowley et al. (2011) and lends support to the idea that hoarding and scrupulosity 
share features beyond those that are common to all disorders within the OCRD 
category. However, our hypothesis about the nature of these shared features was only 
partially supported by our analyses. A structural equation model in which hoarding 
and scrupulosity were both connected by causal paths to three latent factors 
representing guilt and shame, moralistic thinking, and cognitive flexibility 
demonstrated poor fit to the data, and only the cognitive flexibility factor 
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demonstrated significant relationships to both dependent variables. Additionally, our 
model of the moralistic thinking factor failed to demonstrate measurement of a 
coherent construct. Although we also observed a defect in the measurement model of 
guilt and shame, the factor did not demonstrate significant effects on the dependent 
variables even when the defective indicator was removed from the model.  
 In order to improve our explanatory model, we conducted a number of post-
hoc analyses. We first examined the bivariate correlations of potential predictor 
variables with hoarding and scrupulosity and identified those that were significantly 
related to both conditions. These variables were then entered into multiple regression 
analyses to control for overlap between the predictors, and these analyses yielded an 
identical three-predictor set, consisting of anticipated guilt, sentimental moral 
orientation, and cognitive rigidity. Next, this predictor set was tested simultaneously 
on both dependent variables using SEM, which showed that the combination of the 
three variables explained a considerable portion of the shared variance between 
hoarding and scrupulosity. Finally, we examined the specificity of this model by 
testing the influence of the predictor set on four dimensions of OCD symptoms, and 
we found that none of these OCD dimensions related significantly to all three 
predictors. Although the final explanatory model specified through this post-hoc 
analytic process differed from our initial hypothetical model in a number of important 
ways, the predictor set in both models were drawn from the same three domains: guilt 
and shame, moral reasoning, and general cognitive rigidity. Our findings in each of 
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these domains have implications for the conceptualization and treatment of hoarding 
and scrupulosity.  
Guilt and Shame  
 Although guilt and shame feature prominently in clinical descriptions of both 
hoarding and scrupulosity, assessment of these emotions is lacking in research on 
these disorders. Therefore, in the current investigation we sought to establish 
empirical support for the idea that a tendency to experience intense guilt and shame 
contributes to the development and maintenance of both hoarding and scrupulosity, 
and that this tendency helps to explain the correlation between these clinical 
conditions. To accomplish this, we assessed these moral emotions using the 
Anticipated Guilt scale (Roseman et al., 1994) and the Guilt and Shame Proneness 
scale (Cohen et al., 2011), both of which measure affective and behavioral responses 
associated with guilt and shame. In the Anticipated Guilt scale, all of these responses 
load onto a single scale. In contrast, the GASP contains separate subscales for guilt 
and shame, and separate scales for negative evaluations and action tendencies within 
each of those emotions. By employing both measures, we hoped to disentangle the 
separate effects of guilt and shame, which are often conflated in everyday language 
(Covert et al., 2003). 
 Our findings in this domain were mixed. In the initial SEM model, the latent 
factor Guilt and Shame, which was composed of all five moral emotion variables, did 
not have significant effects on hoarding or scrupulosity. However, in the post-hoc 
analyses, two individuals variables – the Anticipated Guilt scale and the GASP 
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withdraw subscale – had significant bivariate correlations with both disorders, and the 
Anticipated Guilt scale remained a significant predictor when controlling for other 
shared factors. These results support the notion that at least some facets of guilt and 
shame underlie the connection between hoarding and scrupulosity.  
In contrast, separating the specific effects of these two emotions proved more 
problematic. The fact that the shame-withdraw subscale was the only GASP scale 
significantly related to both hoarding and scrupulosity raised the possibility that the 
significant effects of the Anticipated Guilt scale could be attributed to the influence of 
its shame-related items, and therefore shame, but not guilt, might relate to both 
disorders. Such an interpretation would be consistent with previous research findings 
suggesting that shame has a more deleterious effect on psychological adjustment than 
does guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 2003). However, in our data, the Anticipated Guilt 
scale demonstrated strong relationships with all of the GASP scales except the shame 
withdraw scale, indicating that the effects of these two scales on the dependent 
variables are not redundant. It therefore appears that both shame and guilt are shared 
features of hoarding and scrupulosity, but their relative contributions to the 
connection between the disorders remain uncertain. 
 Despite this ambiguity about the different effects of guilt and shame, our 
findings highlight the importance of moral emotions in understanding hoarding and 
scrupulosity. Like anxiety, which is a prominent feature of both disorders, guilt and 
shame are likely to evoke dysfunctional, negatively reinforced behavior, including 
avoidance of discarding in hoarding or compulsive ritualizing in scrupulosity. 
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However, unlike anxiety, there is no evidence that guilt and shame gradually decrease 
or become more tolerable with repeated exposure to the stimuli that provoke these 
emotions, nor does this idea make intuitive sense. Therefore, exposure-based 
treatments for these disorders might be limited in their influence on guilt and shame. 
These treatments might be enhanced by integrating techniques that promote other 
ways of responding to intense emotion, such as teaching distress tolerance (Linehan, 
2014) or cognitive defusion skills (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). 
Moral Reasoning 
 Our initial hypothesis included the prediction that the connection between 
hoarding and scrupulosity would be partially explained by moralistic thinking, 
defined as the combination of a rigid, dichotomous style of moral reasoning and the 
belief that moral judgments are best made by strict adherence to prescribed rules. This 
prediction was based largely on clinical observations of these disorders, which 
include descriptions of apparent rigid adherence to inflexible moral principles, such 
as an injunction against wasting in hoarding or an imperative to complete religious 
rituals perfectly in scrupulosity. Additionally, this prediction was supported by 
empirical studies suggesting that obsessive-compulsive symptoms are associated with 
deontological moral reasoning and moral rigidity in classical moral dilemmas 
(Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton et al., 2014). However, our results did not 
support our initial prediction, but instead pointed towards a moral reasoning style 
characterized by the belief that moral decisions should be based on emotion rather 
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than rules or logic. These results have several implications for understanding moral 
reasoning in hoarding and scrupulosity. 
 First, the inverse relationship between our measures of moral rigidity and rule-
based moral orientation contradicted our notion that these are two positively related 
aspects of a moralistic thinking style. Close inspection of the item content of these 
two variables highlights the complexity of this surprising result. Items in the moral 
rigidity variable describe an absolute and dichotomous sense of right and wrong that 
is insensitive to contextual details such as the motivations or consequences involved 
in the situation. However, these items do not specify the basis on which right and 
wrong is distinguished. In contrast, although some of the items of the MOS Rule 
subscale include dichotomous moral terms (“right or wrong”, “good or bad”), the 
central theme of most items is the belief that moral judgments should be strictly based 
on rules. Therefore, the negative correlation between these two variables raises the 
possibility that people who endorse a dichotomous and absolute distinction between 
right and wrong tend to do so based on something other than prescribed moral rules.   
 Secondly, regardless of the relationship between moral rigidity and rule 
orientation, neither variable explained the relationship between hoarding and 
scrupulosity. Moral rigidity was not related to either condition, and rule orientation 
was related only to scrupulosity. In terms of hoarding, these results suggest that 
difficulty discarding possessions for moral reasons is not the result of rigid beliefs 
about moral rules or an absolute sense of right and wrong. In contrast, scrupulous 
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individuals may believe that moral rules are important, but they may not believe that 
these rules describe rigid or dichotomous moral principles.  
 Although neither moral rigidity nor rule orientation explained the connection 
between hoarding and scrupulosity, a sentimental moral orientation was related to 
both conditions. This orientation is characterized by the belief that emotion is more 
important than logic when making moral judgments. Example items from the MOS 
Sentiment scale include “To do the right thing you must follow your heart” and “In 
matters of morality, heart is more important than your head.” In terms of dual process 
theories of moral reasoning, these beliefs about the importance of emotion tend to 
decrease the extent to which rational deliberation influences moral decision-making 
and thereby increase the influence of emotional responses (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013; Conway et al., 2016). If these beliefs are common to hoarding and scrupulosity, 
it suggests that the rigid morality noted in clinical accounts of these conditions results 
at least in part from a rigid adherence, not to prescribed rules, but to emotionally 
driven intuitive responses. For example, in hoarding, moral judgments about 
discarding objects may be driven primarily by feelings of guilt and shame, and 
thoughts about the immorality of wasting may serve only as post-hoc rationalizations 
of these emotions, rather than causing them. In scrupulosity this process may be even 
more complex, because intuitive emotional responses and beliefs about the 
importance of rules may both contribute to rigid patterns of avoidance of moral 
transgressions. 
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The beliefs that comprise a sentimental moral orientation appear conceptually 
related to the idea of emotional reasoning (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005). In 
emotional reasoning, conclusions are drawn about oneself or the world based on 
feelings, rather than objective information (Arntz, Rauner, & Van den Hout, 1995). 
Cognitive models of emotional disorders identify emotional reasoning as a cognitive 
distortion that contributes to the development and maintenance of clinical symptoms 
(Beck et al., 2005). For example, individuals with anxiety disorders display a greater 
tendency to base estimations of threat on subjective feelings of anxiety compared to 
non-anxious controls (Berle et al., 2016). Similarly, individuals with intense 
contamination fears tend to infer the presence of contamination risk based on feelings 
of disgust (Verwoerd, de Jong, Wessel, & van Hout, 2013). In relation specifically to 
guilt, Gangemi et al. (2007) found that people with a strong tendency to feel guilty 
use temporary feelings of guilt as information when evaluating the likelihood of 
negative outcomes in OCD-relevant situations. Although emotional reasoning has not 
been assessed specifically in investigations of hoarding and scrupulosity, our results 
suggest that it may be a common cognitive distortion in these conditions.  
These findings have important implications for cognitive-behavioral 
treatments of hoarding and scrupulosity. These treatments often include cognitive 
restructuring techniques intended to undermine and correct cognitive distortions by 
examining objective evidence. However, if objective evidence is already of lesser 
value than emotions because of emotional reasoning or sentimental moral orientation, 
it seems unlikely that emphasizing such evidence in treatment would lead to 
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correcting patterns of distorted thinking. Indeed, a recent investigation of the effects 
of CBT on treatment-seeking individuals with anxiety disorders demonstrated that 
emotional reasoning tendencies were largely insensitive to commonly used cognitive 
restructuring techniques (Berle et al., 2016). Therefore, treatments for hoarding and 
scrupulosity might be enhanced by integrating other cognitive approaches that 
emphasize the ways in which moral decisions motivated by emotions conflict with 
long-term valued goals, rather than with objective evidence.   
Cognitive Rigidity 
In our original model, cognitive rigidity was conceptualized as a broad pattern 
of inflexible thinking within which a more specific pattern of morally rigid thinking 
was embedded, and the effects of both variables were hypothesized to help explain 
the connection between hoarding and scrupulosity. However, this conceptualization is 
not consistent with our results for two reasons. First, there was no correlation between 
cognitive rigidity and moral rigidity. Second, although moral rigidity was associated 
with neither hoarding nor scrupulosity, cognitive rigidity was related to both 
outcomes.  These results suggest that cognitive rigidity must play some other role in 
hoarding and scrupulosity besides simply shaping dichotomous thinking about moral 
matters.  
One possible explanation of how cognitive rigidity may function in these 
disorders can be found by appealing again to dual-process models of moral judgment. 
According to these models, emotionally driven intuitive responses to moral questions 
can be offset by rational deliberation about the potential consequences of one’s action 
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(Haidt, 2001). Consequently, diminished abstract reasoning tends to result in the 
predominance of emotional reactions in moral situations, as evidenced by research 
showing that reducing cognitive control through a cognitive load manipulation 
reduces utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2008; Greene et al., 
2004). Whitton et al. (2014) examined this process in individuals with OCD and 
found that neuropsychological impairments in cognitive flexibility were also related 
to decreased utilitarian moral reasoning. Along these lines, our data showed that 
higher cognitive flexibility was related to a deliberative moral orientation, which 
involves resolving moral questions through a consideration of alternative viewpoints 
and potential consequences. Additionally, this deliberative orientation was negatively 
related to scrupulosity and trended towards a negative relationship with hoarding. 
Therefore, our findings suggest that cognitive rigidity may function in both hoarding 
and scrupulosity as a limiting factor in the process of critically evaluating intuitive 
responses to moral issues, leading to the predominance of choices motivated by guilt 
and shame rather than by a broader consideration of potential consequences. 
Moreover, this appears to be a different, though perhaps related, process from the 
influence of a sentimental moral orientation, which increases the influence of 
emotions in moral judgment because emotions are valued as moral guides. In 
contrast, cognitive rigidity increases the influence of emotions by decreasing the 
opposing force of rational deliberation.  
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Summary of Findings 
 Taken together, our findings in the domains of moral emotions, moral 
reasoning, and cognitive flexibility point to a cohesive and compelling picture of how 
these factors connect hoarding and scrupulosity. Specifically, these conditions are 
related to the tendency to experience intense feelings of shame and guilt when faced 
with the possibility of a moral transgression. These feelings drive the intuitive sense 
that the transgression is morally wrong, and this intuition is reinforced by beliefs that 
emotions are the best guides when making moral evaluations. At the same time, the 
possibility of overriding these intuitive responses through rational deliberation about 
the consequences of one’s actions is reduced because of impairments in cognitive 
flexibility. These processes help to explain the clinical observation that individuals 
with hoarding disorder and scrupulous OCD repeatedly engage in dysfunctional 
behaviors for moral reasons, despite these behaviors contributing to long-term 
distress and impairment. These findings also help to identify targets and strategies for 
treatment, such as building tolerance for distressing moral emotions, addressing 
distorted emotional reasoning with cognitive therapy techniques besides examining 
evidence, and promoting cognitive flexibility through problem-solving skills training. 
Limitations 
 There are several noteworthy limitations to the current study. First, although 
guilt and shame, sentimental moral orientation, and cognitive rigidity explained a 
considerable portion of the shared variance between hoarding and scrupulosity, the 
partial correlation between the outcome variables in the final model remained 
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significant, indicating that other common features between these conditions have yet 
to be identified. Additionally, although significant relationships with all three 
predictor variables in our model were only found with hoarding and scrupulosity, 
other forms of OCD were related to individual predictors. Therefore, the specificity of 
these relationships to hoarding and scrupulosity remains unclear.  
Second, many of our interpretations were based on the results of post-hoc 
analyses, which were conducted in an exploratory mode without the guidance of 
specific hypotheses. Additionally, we did not control for family-wise type I error rates 
across multiple tests of statistical significance, which increased the risk that our 
interpretations were based on results obtained by chance. Although such an 
exploratory and liberal approach was appropriate given the relative scarcity of prior 
research in this area, interpretations made from our results should be viewed as 
extremely tentative and they require replication in future studies with stricter 
management of risk of type I error.  
 Third, our statistical models include directional effects that are based in 
theory, but the cross-sectional design of our study and correlational nature of our data 
do not allow for inferences about causality. Therefore, in spite of our theoretical 
perspective, it is not possible to determine from our data whether guilt and shame, 
sentimental moral orientation, and cognitive rigidity function as etiological or 
maintenance factors in hoarding and scrupulosity, or whether they are simply shared 
consequences of both disorders.  
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Fourth, although we were primarily interested in examining the relationship 
between two clinical conditions, our sample was drawn from a community rather than 
a clinical population. Additionally, the heterogeneity of our sample was limited, as 
most participants were white, not Hispanic or Latino/a, and heterosexual. Therefore, 
it is possible that our results will not generalize to clinical and more culturally diverse 
populations. 
Fifth, although our measure of moral rigidity was derived from an instrument 
with good psychometric properties, it was not itself subjected to a comprehensive 
validation process. Thus, although the variable was internally consistent, there is no 
evidence on which to base conclusions about its construct validity. This raises the 
possibility that our interpretations about the absence of moral rigidity in hoarding and 
scrupulosity were premature.  
Finally, a violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity was detected in the 
multiple regression analysis using the PIOS as the dependent variable, which may 
have biased estimates of standard errors in this model and therefore distorted 
significance tests of the regression coefficients. However, a natural logarithm 
transformation of the PIOS was used as the dependent variable in a separate analysis, 
and this analysis showed no substantial heteroscedasticity and no meaningful 
difference in regression coefficients or overall model fit. Therefore, the violation of 
the assumption of homoscedasticity does not appear to invalidate the results of the 
original analysis. 




 In addition to addressing these limitations, future research may focus on a 
number of questions raised by the current investigation. Although our self-report 
measures indicate that hoarding and scrupulosity are associated with a tendency to 
experience guilt and shame, assessment of these emotions in vivo during clinically 
relevant-situations would help to confirm this finding and help to identify specific 
triggers of these emotions. Similarly, it would be useful to examine whether 
sentimental moral orientation beliefs vary between situations that are specific to these 
disorders and those that are not. For example, individuals who hoard may address 
moral questions about saving differently than they address other moral questions, and 
individuals with scrupulous OCD may hold specific beliefs about the morality of their 
compulsions that differ from their other moral beliefs. In terms of the influence of 
cognitive rigidity, future research could examine the extent to which individuals with 
these disorders differ from healthy individuals when generating alternatives and 
considering consequences to actual moral situations, as compared to the use of self-
report measures and unrealistic philosophical dilemmas. Additionally, it might be 
useful to determine if other neuropsychological deficits, such as the deficits in 
sustained attention believed to influence hoarding, contribute to decreased rational 
deliberation and increased emotional reasoning in moral matters.  
Conclusion 
 The current study was the first to examine factors that explain the relationship 
between hoarding and scrupulosity. Results showed that these conditions are 
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associated with a tendency to experience intense guilt and shame, to value these 
emotions as important information in evaluations of right and wrong, and to have 
difficulty overriding these emotionally driven intuitions through rational deliberation 
about the consequences of moral decisions. Although replication is needed to further 
support these findings, these data provide an intriguing perspective on moral issues in 
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Appendix 1 - Consent Form 
Beliefs and Attitudes related to OC Spectrum Symptoms  
 
You are being invited to participate in an anonymous research study being conducted 
by researchers at Nova Southeastern University and University of Miami.  
 
To participate you must be at least 18 years of age.  
 
The purpose of this research study is to gather information about thoughts and 
feelings connected to morality, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and hoarding 
symptoms. You will be asked questions regarding your thoughts, feelings, day-to-day 
behaviors, and spiritual/religious beliefs. The research study will take approximately 
30-60 minutes to complete.  
 
Responses are completely anonymous. You will not be asked to provide identifying 
information as part of the research study and the computer system through which this 
research study is being administered to you (Redcap) will not collect or store any 
information related to your identity, including computer IP addresses. Therefore, all 
data will remain completely confidential and anonymous.  
 
The only risks to participation are that some questions in the research study could 
make you feel bored or upset in some way. You can choose to not answer any 
question and you may stop at any time.  
 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact:  
 
Keith Lit: kl676@nova.edu  
Jedidiah Siev, PhD: js3088@nova.edu  
Or call: 954-262-5809  
 
Your participation is greatly appreciated.  
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Appendix 2 - The Guilt Inventory – Moral Standards Subscale & Moral Rigidity 
Variable 
(Kugler & Jones, 1992) 
 
Items not included in the Moral Rigidity variable 
3. I have always believed strongly in a firm set of moral-ethical principles. 
7. My goal in life is to enjoy it rather than to live up to some abstract set of moral 
principles.* 
11. There are only a few things I would never do.* 
13. My ideas of right and wrong are quite flexible.* 
15. There are many things I would just never do because I believe they are wrong. 
22. In certain circumstances, there is almost nothing I wouldn’t do.* 
24. I would rather die than commit a serious act of wrongdoing. 
25. I feel a strong need to live up to my moral values. 
32. I never worry about what I do; I believe life will take care of itself.* 
38. I am immediately aware of it when I have done something morally wrong. 
  
Items included in the Moral Rigidity variable 
1. I believe in a strict interpretation of right and wrong. 
18. Morality is not as “black and white” as many people would suggest.* 
28. I believe that you can’t judge whether something is right or wrong without 
knowing the motives of the people involved and the situation in which they are 
acting.* 
39. What is right or wrong depends on the situation.* 
42. I believe that moral values are absolute. 
 
Response options:  
(1) strongly agree (2) agree (3) undecided (4) disagree (5) strongly disagree 
 
* = Item is reverse scored. 
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Appendix 3 - Moral Orientation Scale 
Conway, Love, & Mottner (2015) 
 
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. There is no right or wrong answer; we are simply interested in your 
personal opinion.  
 
Response scale: 1 = Strongly disagree – 7 = Strongly agree 
 
Affective Orientation  
1. Unethical behavior does not bother me. (Reversed)  
2. It upsets me when people do something unethical.  
3. I tend to get upset when I see someone cheating.  
4. When I think of people getting hurt it makes me upset.  
5. I cringe when I see someone get injured.  
6. I tend to feel strong emotions when someone behaves unethically.  
7. Other people's pain is very real to me.  
 
Deliberative Orientation  
8. When people disagree over ethical matters, I strive for workable compromises.  
9. When thinking of ethical problems, I try to develop practical, workable 
alternatives.  
10. Ethical decisions are best made on a case by case basis.  
11. When people disagree over ethical matters I strive for some points of agreement.  
12. When faced with an ethical dilemma people should focus on results.  
13. It is of value to societies to be responsive and adapt to new conditions as the 
world changes.  




15. When faced with an ethical dilemma people should focus on rules.  
16. A person's actions should be described in terms of being right or wrong.  
17. A person's actions should be described in terms of being good or bad.  
18. It upsets me when I see someone doing something that is impure.  
19. Societies should follow stable traditions and maintain a distinctive identity.  
20. Ethical decisions are best made by following a predefined set of rules.  
21. Uttering a falsehood is wrong because it wouldn't be right for anyone to lie.  
 
Sentiment Orientation  
22. In matters of morality, heart is more important than your head.  
23. I tend to follow my heart rather than my head when faced with an ethical 
dilemma.  
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24. Empathy is more important than logic when faced with an ethical dilemma.  
25. I admire people who experience emotion when considering ethical dilemmas.  
26. To do the right thing you must follow your heart.  
27. When making ethical decisions, I trust my heart to be my guide.  
28. Without emotion, it would be very hard to make the right decision when faced 
with an ethical dilemma. 
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Appendix 4 - Anticipated Guilt Scale 
(Roseman et al., 1994) 
 
Please read the following scenario:  
 
A typical Saturday... You are in a retail shop doing your weekly shopping. At the 
checkout you are not able to pay the exact amount. When receiving the change, you 
notice the cashier made a mistake and gives you too much change.  
 
Rate the statements below using the following scale:  
(1) not at all (2) very little (3) somewhat (4) much (5) very much  
 
If I did not report the mistake and instead pocketed the change...  
1. I would feel tension. 
2. I would feel remorse.   
3. I would think that I was in the wrong. 
4. I would think that I shouldn’t have done what I did.  
5. I would feel like undoing what I have done. 
6. I would feel like punishing myself. 
7. I would apologize. 
8. I would avoid meeting people’s gaze. 
9. I would want to make up for what I have done wrong. 
10. I would want to be forgiven. 
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Appendix 5 - Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale 
(Cohen et al., 2011) 
Instructions: In this questionnaire you will read about situations that people are likely 
to encounter in day‐to‐day life, followed by common reactions to those situations. As 
you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the 
likelihood that you would react in the way described.  
 
(1) Very Unlikely (2) Unlikely (3) Slightly Unlikely (4) About 50% Likely  (5) Slightly 
Likely (6) Likely (7)Very Likely  
 
1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep 
it because the salesclerk doesn't notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel 
uncomfortable about keeping the money?  
 
2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not 
make the honor society because you skipped too many days of school. What is the 
likelihood that this would lead you to become more responsible about attending 
school?  
 
3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher 
discovers what you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the 
likelihood that this would make you would feel like a bad person?  
 
4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were 
depending on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your coworkers. What is the 
likelihood that you would feign sickness and leave work?  
 
5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the 
likelihood that your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort 
to keep secrets in the future?  
 
6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your coworkers it 
was your fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you 
would feel incompetent?  
 
7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you 
would stop spending time with that friend?  
 
8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite 
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9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse 
about breaking the law?  
 
10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies 
are discovered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you 
would think you are a despicable human being?  
 
11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was 
aware of it, you realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this 
would make you think more carefully before you speak?  
 
12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What 
is the likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job?  
 
13. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. 
Later, your coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood 
that you would feel like a coward?  
 
14. At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream‐ 
colored carpet. You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. 
What is the likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?  
 
15. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are 
shouting though nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would 
try to act more considerately toward your friends?  
 
16. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you 
would feel terrible about the lies you told?  
 
GASP SCORING: The GASP is scored by summing or averaging the four items in 
each subscale.  
Guilt‐Negative‐Behavior‐Evaluation (NBE): 1, 9, 14, 16  
Guilt‐Repair: 2, 5, 11, 15  
Shame‐Negative‐Self‐Evaluation (NSE): 3, 6, 10, 13 
Shame‐Withdraw: 4, 7, 8, 12  
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Appendix 6 - Cognitive Flexibility Scale  
(Martin & Rubin, 1995) 
 
Instructions: The following statements deal with your beliefs and feelings about 
your own behavior. Read each statement and respond by circling the number that 
best represents your agreement with each statement.  
 
(6)Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) Slightly Agree (3) Slightly Disagree (2) Disagree 
(1) Strongly Disagree  
 
1. I can communicate an idea in many different ways.  
2. I avoid new and unusual situations. * 
3. I feel like I never get to make decisions. * 
4. I can find workable solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.  
5. I seldom have choices when deciding how to behave. *  
6. I am willing to work at creative solutions to problems.  
7. In any given situation, I am able to act appropriately.  
8. My behavior is a result of conscious decisions that I make.  
9. I have many possible ways of behaving in any given situation.  
10. I have difficulty using my knowledge on a given topic in real life situations.* 
11. I am willing to listen and consider alternatives for handling a problem.  
12. I have the self-confidence necessary to try different ways of behaving.  
 
* = Item is reverse scored. 
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Appendix 7 - Cognitive Flexibility Inventory 
(Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010) 
 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. I am good at ‘‘sizing up’’ situations. 
2. I have a hard time making decisions when faced with difficult situations.* 
3. I consider multiple options before making a decision. 
4. When I encounter difficult situations, I feel like I am losing control.* 
5. I like to look at difficult situations from many different angles. 
6. I seek additional information not immediately available before attributing causes to 
behavior 
7. When encountering difficult situations, I become so stressed that I cannot think of a 
way to resolve the situation.* 
8. I try to think about things from another person’s point of view. 
9. I find it troublesome that there are so many different ways to deal with difficult 
situations.* 
10. I am good at putting myself in others’ shoes. 
11. When I encounter difficult situations, I just don’t know what to do.* 
12. It is important to look at difficult situations from many angles.  
13. When in difficult situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to 
behave. 
14. I often look at a situation from different viewpoints. 
15. I am capable of overcoming the difficulties in life that I face.* 
16. I consider all the available facts and information when attributing causes to 
behavior. 
17. I feel I have no power to change things in difficult situations.* 
18. When I encounter difficult situations, I stop and try to think of several ways to 
resolve it. 
19. I can think of more than one way to resolve a difficult situation I’m confronted 
with. 
20. I consider multiple options before responding to difficult situations. 
 
* = Item is reverse scored. 
 
